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THE LIMITS TO LEGISLATIVE POWER
IN THE PASSAGE OF CURATIVE
LAWS.
There has always been some regret that,
when the Federal judiciary was called upon
to interpret and apply the prohibition in the
Constitution of ex post facto laws,' it did not
reach the condlusion that retrospective laws
were forbidden, as well where they applied to
civil rights as when they concerned criminal
liabilities or penalties. The famous twenty-
ninth chapter of the great charter placed the
protection of liberty and property upon the
same basis, and the power to reach the one
by indirection is subject to the same objec-
tions in principle, that could be urged against
the power to reach the other by the same
method. This is so strongly felt that
tile courts, while compelled by authority to
admit the power to pass retrospective laws,
nevertheless refuse to find that the power has
been exercised in a particular case, unless the
terms of the statute are such as imperatively
to require it.2 Some States have deemed it
wise to forbid retrospective laws altogether,
and this has relieved the judicial mind of
.some embarrassment, thqugh such a prohibi-
tion must still leave optn the question what
a retrospective law is. In New Hampshire
it is held, that a statute regulating and niodi-
fying remedies is not retrospective, though
made to apply to causes of action previously
existing. 3 The same ruling has been had in
Tennessee ;4 and even in criminal cases the
modification of remedies may be made to ap-
ply to previous offenses, provided the modifi-
cations are not such as to deprive accused
parties of substantial rights.3 On the other
I Calderv. Bull, 3 Dall. 390: Satterlec v. Matthew-
son, 2 Pet. 380; Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How.
463; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277.
2 Dash v. Van Kleck, 7 Johns. 477; Gerry v. Stone-
ham, 1 Allen, 319; Donahoe v. Coleman, 46 Conn.
319; Chicago v. Rumsey, 87 111. 348; Rogers v. Green-
bush, 58 Me. 395; Danville v. Pace, 25 Gratt. 1; Gar-
rett v. Beaumont, 24 Miss. 377; State v. Ferguson, 62
Mo. 77; Baldwin v. Newark, 38 N. J. 158.
3 Rich v. Flanders, 39N. H. 304; Simpson v. Sav-
ings Bank, $6 N. H. 466. See De Cordova v. Galves-
ton, 4 Texas, 470; Officer v. Young, 5 Yerg. 320.
4 Negroes v. Dabbs, 6 Yerg. 119.
5 State v. Wilson, 48KN. H. 398; Walter v. People.
32 N. Y. 147; Warren v. Commonwealth, 37 Pa. St.
45; Jones v. State, I Geo. 610; Seeley v. Thomas,
$1 Ohio St. 301.
hand, to give'a right,!of, action where n 6 ie
existed before, is clearly retrospective..
A retrospective law is one which is made
to operate upon some subject, transaction or
contract which existed before its passage,
and which is intended to give it t different
legal effect from that it would have had with-
out it. The definition itself is sufficient to
show that such a law must be inoperative so,
far as its effect would be to impair any obli-
gation which has been assumed by contract ;7
but the power to affirm and give legal validi-
ty to an invalid contract which parties had
previously attempted to make on sufficient
consideration, has often been affirmed, 8 and
is often strictly just.
The chief practical difficulty arises, when
an attempt is made to cure defects which
have occurred in judicial and other proceed-
ings by reason of the failure to obey the re-
quirements of.law. That this may be done
in a great variety of cases, is undoubted. 9
That it can not be done in other cases, is.
equally certain. But what are the cases in
which it may be done, and what those in
which it may not be?
The principle on which the decided cases.
have ranged themselves is clear enough. A
retrospective act which merely takes away a
technical defense is not unjust and not in-
competent. Therefore a mere informality in,
judicial or 'administrative proceedings may
be cured retrospectively, provided the legis-
lature which attempts to cure it, has power
at the time to authorize such a proceeding as
was actually had.' 0 This is on the ground
that a merely technical defense is not a meri-
torious defense, and therefore the party has
Woart v. Winnich, 3 N H. 473; s. c., 14Am. Dec.
384; Clark v. Clark, ION. 11. 380.
7 Const. U.-S., Art 1, see. 10, cl. 1; White v. Craw-
ford, 81 Pa. St. 433.
8 Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 225; s. c. 10 Am.
Dec. 121; Lewis v. McElvain, 16 Ohio, 347; Hers v.
Werts, 4 Serg. & R. 360; Savings Bank v. Allen, 28
Conn. 97; Woodruff v. Scruggs, 27 Ark. 26; s. c. 11
Am. Rep. 777; Thompson v. Morgan, 6 Minn. 292;
Journeay v. Gibson, 56 Pa. St. 57; Grovev. Todd,
41 Md. 633. Compare Chestnut v. Shane, 16 Ohio, 599
and Barnetv. Barnet, 15 Serg. & R. 72; s.c. 16 Am.
Dec. 516, with Railroad Co. v.Van Horn, 575N. Y. 473,
and Williams v. Wilbur, 67 Ind 42.
9 A large number of cases affirming the right are
collected in the note to Goshen v. Stonington, 10 Am.
Dec. 121, 131.
10 Kimball v. Rosendale, 42 Wis. 407; s. C. 24 Am.
R. 421.
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no right to demand protection in it. On the
other hand, the legislature can not retro-
spectively make valid what it could not
originally have authorized, and, therefore,
can not validate judicial proceedings when
the defect to be cured extends to the juris-
diction of the court which assumed to take
them. It is equally powerless to validate
private acts or administrative proceedings,
when the defects are of a similar nature. It
can not, for example, validate a deed
whereby a party undertakes to convey, con-
trary to the express terms under which he
holds ;11 or one which is a fraud upon other
parties concerned ;12 or a fraudulent tax
sale. 13
Perhaps more often than in any other cases,
the legislature has attempted to exercise its
curative power to make good the sales of
lands for' taxes, where there has been a fail-
ure to comply with the law. In some cases
this is done prospectively; the legislature de-
claring that such and such defects shall not
invalidate the proceedings. This is the same
as saying that the defects enumerated shall
be deemed immaterial; and there is no doubt
of the competency soto declare, where sub-
stamtial rights do not depend upon them.
The power to do this has been carried to very
great lengths in some cases.14
It has been generally agreed that the fail-
ure of the proper officer to give any notice
to which the tax payer was entitled, and
which was important to the protection of his
interests, was such a defect as the legislature
could not retrospectively cure. The recent
case in Massachusetts of Forster v. Forster, 15
is very clear on this point, and at the same
time, perhaps, comes as near the line between
what is admissible and what is not, as any
case to be found in the books. The tax col-
lector was required by law, when taxes on
real estate were delinquent, to advertise that
he would sell so much of the real estate, or
the rents and profits of the whole estate, for
11 Shouk v. Brown, 61 Pa. St. 827.
12 Railroad Co. v. Railroad Co. 50 N. H. 50.
13 Conway v. Cable, 87 111. 82.
14 See Eldridge v. Kuehl, 27 Iowa, 160; Rhodes v.
Sexton, 33 Iowa, 540. Compare Wilson v. McKen-
non, 52 111. 43; Reed v. Tyler, 56 IIl. 288; Silsbee v.
Stockle (Sup. Ct. Mich.), 7 North West. R. 227;
Reading v. Finney,- 73 Va- St. 4b7.
15 11 Cent. L. J. 407.
such term of time as should be sufficient to
discharge the taxes and charges. The col-
lector, instead of obeying this law, advertised
that he would sell the estate, or such undivi-
ded portion thereof as might, be necessary.
The court held that all sales made under this
notice were void. Retrospectively the legis-
lature attempted to cure them, and was held
to be without power for the purpose.
We say this case is near the line, because
here a notice was given, which was as likely
to attract the attention of the parties concern-
ed, as would be one which complied with the
law. and presumptively he had every legal
opportunity to redeem his lands. It may
therefore be urged that he was not injured by
the irregularity, and that it should be classed
with others which give the opportunity for a
mere technical defense. But the notice is
not given for the information of the delin-
quent tax-paver exclusively; it ;s meant for
the information of the public, and to invite
the public to the proposed tax sale. The i.-
tent is that enforcing the tax shall be as little
burdensome as possible to the party taxed;
and if thiz intent is defeated by tlhe notice
actually given, he has a right to complain.
Now the notice actually given in this case
was erroneous on its face. It notified a tax
sale, but not a legal tax sale. The public
would not be invited by it to attend the sale,
because they would know from its terms that
a sale under it would be invalid under the
law as it then stood. They could not know
that any curative statute would be passed,
and would not, therefore, be likely to appear
at the sale. The result would be that the
owner of the estate would lose the benefit of
the competition at the sale which the statute
meant to give him. This would be a sub-
stantial loss, and the error in the notice could
not be a mere irregularity.
But while all this is perfectly true, and the
decision, as we think, undoubtedly sound,
there is very great difficulty and some uncer-
tainty in applying the principle. The very
object of curative statutes is to make good
proceedings in which statutory requirements
have not been observed; and it is supposable
in almost any case that, by reason of the neg-
lect, some other act, which would have been
important to the party, has not been done. If
one curative law may be held good, and an-
HeinOnline  -- 12 Cent. L.J. 3 1881
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other not good, the result is that the validity
of legislation in this class of cases must de-
pend upon the view the court may take of its
justice. If, in the opinion of the court, it
operates unjustly, it must be held void ; but
if not, it may be upheld.'
6  This is not a
satisfactory condition of the law; for the the-
ory of our Government undoubtedly refers
all mere considerations of equity in the en-
actment of laws to the legislature itself, with
powers of final decision. 1 7 Nevertheless, there
are some cases whefe tne course of legislation
itself forces upon the court the necessity of
such a decision. A legislature, for example,
passes an act for the limitation of actions,
and makes it applicable to causes of action
already existing. It is unquestionable that
this may be done; provided, a reasonable
time is allowed in which to bring suit. But
what is a reasonable time? The question is
one of justice and fair dealing ; and the court
will sustain one act and declare another null,
according as it shall think its operation would
be just or unjust.' 8 And the'distinction be-
tween directory and mandatory provisions of
a statute rest largely upon the same princi.
pie. Infinite mischief would be done, were the
courts to hold that all legislative enactments
must be strictly complied with-elections
would fail, and tax proceedings fall to the
ground, especially all those which are special
and exceptional in their nature. The courts
sustain some, and they refuse to sustain
others; and in many cases they have no other
guide than their judgment, whether the ir-
regularities" which have intervened are of a
nature to operate unjustly upon the rights of
parties.1 9  T. M. COOLEY.
16 Watson v. Bailey, 1 Binney, 477; Goshone v.
Purcell, 11 Ohio St. 641.
17 Bennett v. Boggs, Baldw. 74; Pennsylvania R.
Co. v. Reblet, 66 Pa. St. 164, 169.
18 Terry v. Anderson, 9. U. S. 628.
19 French v. Edwards, 13 Wall. 506; Toney v. Mil-
bury, 21 Pick. 67; Koch v. Bridges,45 Miss. 247.
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